Iran condemns Israeli attack on Yemen’s Hodeidah port

ATHENS/QAMISHLI, Syria: Since 2022, senior Syrian and Turkish officials have met regularly in Moscow for talks mediated by Russia. But those meetings failed to lead to a thaw in their icy relations.

However, it is now a different matter, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announcing his desire to restore formal ties with his Syrian counterpart, Bashar Assad.

He said earlier this month that he could invite Assad to Turkey “at any time”, to which the Syrian leader replied that any meeting would depend on “content”.

Ankara and Damascus severed diplomatic ties in 2011 following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Relations have remained hostile since then, especially as Turkiye continues to support armed groups resisting the Assad regime.

Since the civil war broke out in 2011, Turkiye has supported Syrian armed factions in their fight against President Bashar Assad's regime. (AFP)

What, then, is the motivation to change course now? And what are the likely consequences of normalizing Turkish-Syrian ties?

Syrian writer and political researcher Shoresh Darwish believes that President Erdogan is pursuing normalization for two reasons. “The first is the preparation for the possibility of a new US administration led by Donald Trump, which means the possibility of a return to the policy of (US) withdrawal from Syria,” he told Arab News.

“Erdogan will therefore have to cooperate with Assad and Russia.”

This photo released by the Syrian Arab News Agency shows President Bashar Assad (r) meeting with then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Aleppo. (SANA/AFP)

The second reason, Darwish says, is Erdogan's desire to get closer to the Syrian regime's ally, Russia, after Turkiye drifted to the US after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Indeed, as a NATO member state, the conflict has complicated Turkey's normally balanced approach to its ties with Washington and Moscow.

“Ankara's cooperation with Moscow is difficult on the Ukrainian issue,” Darwish said. “As a result of significant Western interference in this issue, their cooperation in Syria is a rallying point through which Erdogan wants to highlight his friendship with Putin and Moscow's interests in the Middle East.”

Those in opposition-held northwest Syria, which is supported by Turkiye, see an Ankara-Damascus rapprochement as a betrayal.

Protesters in opposition-held Idlib and rural Aleppo wave flags of the Syrian revolution and carry signs reading: “If you want to get close to Assad, congratulations, the curse of history is upon you.” (A photo by Ali Ali)

During one of the many protests in Idlib since early July, demonstrators held signs in Arabic that read: “If you want to get closer to Assad, congratulations, the curse of history is upon you.”

Abdulkarim Omar, a political activist from Idlib, told Arab News: “Western Syria, Idlib, rural Aleppo and all areas belonging to the opposition completely reject this behavior because it is only in the interest of the Syrian regime.

“The Syrian people came out 13 years ago and rose in their revolution demanding freedom, dignity and the building of a civil and democratic state for all Syrians. This can only be achieved by overthrowing the tyrannical Syrian regime represented by Bashar Assad. They still cling to this principle and these slogans and cannot abandon them.”

Those living in areas controlled by the Kurdish-led, US-backed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, or AANES, which holds much of Syria's territory east of the Euphrates River, are also wary of to the consequences of normalization.

Map of Syria showing areas controlled by different participants in late 2020. Some cities then under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces have been captured by Turkish forces. (AFP/File)

“There are fears among the population that reconciliation may be a prelude to punishing the Syrian Kurds for their political choices,” Omar said.

Incursions into Syria from 2016 to 2019 saw Turkiye take control of several cities, many of which were previously under AANES control.

Turkiye's justification for its incursions in 2018 and 2019 and its continued presence on Syrian territory was its aim to establish a “safe zone” between itself and the armed forces of AANES – the Syrian Democratic Forces.

A member of the Syrian Kurdish Asayish security forces stands guard as mourners march during the funerals of two Kurdish women killed in a Turkish drone strike in Hasakah, northeastern Syria, on June 21, 2023. (AFP)

Turkiye sees the SDF as a Syrian wing of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, a group that has been in conflict with the Turkish state since the 1980s.

“Of course, the Syrian Kurds know that they will be part of any deal that Erdogan wants to make with Assad,” Darwish said. “This issue bothers the Syrian Kurds, who see that Turkiye is ready to do anything to harm them and their experience of self-rule.”

Darwish says the Syrian Kurds would accept reconciliation on three conditions. First they would like to see Turkiye withdraw its troops from Afrin and Ras Al-Ain. Second, the cessation of Turkish attacks against AANES areas. And third, a guarantee from the Assad regime “that the Syrian Kurds will enjoy their national, cultural and administrative rights.”

In this photo taken on January 27, 2018, a Turkish military convoy passes through the Oncupinar border crossing as troops enter Syria during a military campaign in the Kurdish-held Syrian enclave of Afrin. (AFP/File)

But how likely is a rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus? Not really, according to conflict analyst and UNHRC delegate Thoreau Redcrow. “I find the prospects of an Erdogan and Assad detention very unlikely,” he told Arab News.

“Historically, Turkiye's ideas of 'normalization' with Syria amount to a policy of one-way influence for the benefit of Ankara. In this arrangement, the Turkiye continue to occupy Hatay (Liwa Iskenderun), which they seized from Syria in 1938, and make demands for military incursion on their sovereignty, as in the 1998 Adana Agreement, but give nothing in change.”

Assad has made it clear in public statements that a meeting between him and Erdogan would only take place on the condition that Turkey withdraws from Syrian territory. Redcrow believes that Turkiye has no intention of leaving.

“I don't see Damascus being interested in being manipulated for a photo op,” he said. “The Syrian government is much more proud than some of the other regional actors who are happy to be one of Turkey's 'neo-Ottoman villains'.”

Erdogan could try to capitalize on the trend toward normalization among Arab countries, which began in earnest with Syria's reintegration into the Arab league last year. However, European states and the US remain divided.

Syrian female soldiers march through opposition-held territory in northern Syria. (A photo by Ali Ali)

“While Germany, France, Italy and Britain in particular are more focused on how Turkiye can control the gateway to Europe and act as a 'continental bouncer' for refugees from the Middle East and West Asia, the U.S. is more focused on denying Russia and Iran full access to all of Syria again for strategic reasons, such as access to the Mediterranean Sea and the 'Shiite land bridge' from Tehran to Beirut,” Redcrow said.

“The current status quo is far more beneficial to Washington than any reconciliation would be, as it would also endanger the northeastern parts of Syria, where the US military is embedded with their most reliable military partners against Daesh in the SDF . So Turkiye would not be given any kind of green light to endanger American interests.”

The US House of Representatives in February passed the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act of 2023, which prohibits any normalization with Assad. In a post on social media platform X on July 12, the bill's author, Representative Joe Wilson, expressed his disappointment with Erdogan's calls for normalization, likening it to “normalization with death itself.”

While there may be little chance of reconciliation succeeding at this point, the estimated 3.18 million Syrian refugees living in Turkiye regard even rumors of normalization with fear and dread.

“People are very afraid,” Amal Hayat, a Syrian mother of five who lives in southeastern Turkey, told Arab News. “Since the (reconciliation) rumors started, many people don't even leave their homes. Even if they are beaten by their bosses at work, they are afraid to say anything for fear of being deported.”

A Syrian woman is seen in a refugee camp near the border between Syria and Turkey. (A photo by Ali Ali)

Turkish authorities deported more than 57,000 Syrians in 2023, according to Human Rights Watch.

“A forced return would hurt us a lot,” Hayat said. “For example, if a woman returns to Syria with her family, her husband can be arrested by the regime. Or if a man is deported back to Syria and his wife and children stay in Turkiye, how will they cope? It's hard. Here, our children can study. They have stability and security.”

The fear of deportation has been compounded by waves of violence against Syrian refugees that have swept southern Turkey in recent weeks. On June 30, residents of Kayseri province in central Turkey attacked Syrians and their property.

Anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkey is partly due to economic problems, where Turks see underpaid or even unpaid Syrians as a threat to their job prospects.

“The Turks are very happy that we are coming home,” Hayat said. “For them, it's not soon enough. We all live under increased levels of stress. We only pray that (Assad and Erdogan) do not reconcile.”

Leave a Comment

URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL URL